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NOTES 
MODERN DAY SCHOOL SEGREGATION: 
EQUITY, EXCELLENCE, & EQUAL 
PROTECTION 
DANIELLE KASTEN† 
“The enduring hope is that race should not matter; the reality is 
that too often it does.” 1 
INTRODUCTION 
“You can tell right away, just by looking into a classroom, what 
level it is.”2 
 
“[W]atching this flow of bodies in and out of your classroom.  
One flow comes in, and everyone is black . . . another set of 
bodies flow in and they’re largely white . . . [I]t is undeniable, 
what you see.  You know something is going on.”3 
 
 
† Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., summa cum laude, 2013, St. 
John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2010, Rutgers College, Rutgers University. I 
am immensely grateful to Professor Adam Zimmerman for his invaluable guidance 
and advice. I would also like to extend a very special thank you to Cris Thorne for 
his patience, support, and love, throughout the writing process, law school, and 
beyond. Finally, I want to acknowledge the incredible teachers of the South 
Orange/Maplewood School District—my very own segregated school district—who 
inspired me early and often, taught me to think critically, and encouraged me to 
fight for what I believe in. I would like to especially thank Mr. Jon Campbell, Dr. 
Melissa Cooper, and the late Ms. Carolyn Johnson, may she rest in peace. 
1 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787 
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
2 Jeffrey Gettleman, The Segregated Classrooms of a Proudly Diverse School, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2005, at 1.31 (quoting a student from Columbia High School, in 
Maplewood, New Jersey). 
3 Interview by Cristopher Thorne with Dr. Melissa Cooper, Teacher, Columbia 
High Sch., in Maplewood, N.J. (Nov. 17, 2011) (emphasis added). 
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The “something” that is going on is academic tracking.4  The 
system it creates is separate5 and explicitly unequal.  And it is a 
method of student placement that is more likely to be used in a 
diverse district than in a district that is either exclusively white 
or exclusively black.6  In short, it is a system of within-school 
segregation,7 and it is used pervasively throughout this country’s 
schools.8  Yet to date, courts have only inconsistently found that 
academic tracking constitutes a violation of Equal Protection.9 
Academic tracking “is the educational practice of 
categorizing students by curriculum.”10  The practice involves 
separating students—ostensibly on the basis of “ability”—into 
different “tracks,” “levels,” or “groups,” with distinct or 
differentially paced curriculums.  The typical model involves 
three tracks: (1) “slow or vocational”; (2) “average or general”; 
and (3) “fast or academic.”11  In most districts that track, 
students are placed based on a combination of three criteria: 
(1) standardized test scores; (2) “teacher and counselor 
recommendations (including grades)”; and (3) “students’ and 
their parents’ choices.”12  While this practice is facially race-
neutral, its effect is not.  When tracking is employed in a diverse 
district, students become racially segregated, with white 
students being placed disproportionately in “fast or academic” 
tracks and students of color being largely relegated to “slow or 
vocational” tracks.13 
 
4 See id. 
5 See Gettleman, supra note 2. 
6 Peter G. VanderHart, Why Do Some Schools Group by Ability? Some Evidence 
from the NAEP, 65 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 435, 449 (2006). 
7 See id. at 457; see also People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 851 F. Supp. 
905, 917 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
8 CAROL CORBETT BURRIS & DELIA T. GARRITY, DETRACKING FOR EXCELLENCE 
AND EQUITY vii (2008). 
9 Compare Ga. State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 
1403, 1412, 1429 (11th Cir. 1985), with People Who Care, 851 F. Supp. at 933. 
10 C. Anne Broussard & Alfred L. Joseph, Tracking: A Form of Educational 
Neglect?, 20 SOC. WORK EDUC. 110, 111 (1998). 
11 Id. The specific form of academic tracking with which this Note takes issue is 
that which classifies students into at least two tracks and which separates students 
of different tracks into different classrooms. 
12 JEANNIE OAKES, KEEPING TRACK: HOW SCHOOLS STRUCTURE INEQUALITY 9 
(2d ed. 2005). Different schools may weigh the three categories differently, placing 
greater emphasis on test scores, grades, or other criteria. Id. 
13 See Angelia Dickens, Note, Revisiting Brown v. Board of Education: How 
Tracking Has Resegregated America’s Public Schools, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 
469, 473–74 (1996). 
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Few people would argue that academic tracking does not 
have a racially disproportionate impact.  However, 
disproportionate impact alone is not enough to make out an 
Equal Protection violation.14  The Supreme Court has drawn a 
firm distinction between de jure and de facto discrimination.15  
The former describes discrimination that results from intentional 
state action,16 while the latter refers to racially disproportionate 
impacts that are the result of circumstances over which the state 
has no control.17  Under existing Supreme Court precedent, only 
de jure discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause.18 
As a result, current legal challenges to tracking have met 
with inconsistent results.  Rather than address the 
constitutionality of academic tracking generally, courts have 
decided its constitutionality on a district-by-district basis.19  
Moreover, different courts have judged its constitutionality under 
different legal standards.  Under the McNeal standard, for 
instance, academic tracking systems only constitute de jure 
segregation where the district can demonstrate neither that the 
segregative effect is not the result of past segregation nor that 
the tracking system will remedy the detrimental effects of past 
segregation.20  Other courts have found that academic tracking 
constitutes de jure segregation when plaintiffs can establish that 
the district acted with the purpose or intent to segregate.21  While 
academic scholars have proposed more broad-based challenges to 
tracking, those challenges have either relied on statutory relief or 
advanced Equal Protection approaches that rest on shaky 
precedential ground.22 
This Note argues that, under existing Supreme Court 
precedent, academic tracking constitutes de jure segregation.  It 
further contends that academic tracking systems need not be 
analyzed on a district-by-district basis because—in light of their 
 
14 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
15 See id. at 240. 
16 Id. 
17 See NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1049 (6th Cir. 1977). 
18 See Davis, 426 U.S. at 240. 
19 See McNeal v. Tate Cnty. Sch. Dist., 508 F.2d 1017, 1019–20 (5th Cir. 1975); 
People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 851 F. Supp. 905, 912, 1001 (N.D. Ill. 
1994); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 406–07 (D.D.C. 1967), aff’d sub nom. 
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
20 McNeal, 508 F.2d at 1020. 
21 See, e.g., People Who Care, 851 F. Supp. at 1001. 
22 See infra Part II.C.2. 
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unique history—wherever an academic tracking system creates 
within school segregation, it is per se unconstitutional.  Part I of 
this Note analyzes the unique history of academic tracking, 
drawing parallels between academic tracking systems and 
segregation explicitly mandated by law.  Part II outlines current 
Equal Protection doctrine both generally and within the unique 
context of schools, and explores how that doctrine has been 
applied to academic tracking cases.  Finally, Part III reanalyzes 
the application of Equal Protection doctrine to academic tracking, 
ultimately concluding that, when properly analyzed under 
existing precedent, academic tracking constitutes de jure 
segregation and is therefore unconstitutional. 
I. THE RACIALIZED HISTORY OF ACADEMIC TRACKING SYSTEMS 
From its inception, academic tracking has been a racialized 
practice.  This Part demonstrates the inextricable link between 
academic tracking and race.  Section A reviews the origins of 
tracking practices and, in so doing, demonstrates that the same 
reasoning that supported explicit racial segregation has been 
used to justify academic tracking.  Section B establishes that the 
explicit assumptions about racialized-ability that supported 
tracking at its inception continue to pervade modern academic 
tracking discourse. 
A. The Birth of Academic Tracking 
From some of its earliest appearances in legal text, the 
concept of segregating students on the basis of race was 
intimately tied to concepts of ability.23  Almost fifty years before 
the Supreme Court condoned the doctrine of “separate but 
equal,”24 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld 
Boston’s use of a dual school system for black and white 
children.25  The Court granted the school committee broad 
discretion to “arrange, classify, and distribute pupils, in such a 
manner as they think best adapted to their general proficiency 
and welfare.”26  So long as the school committee exercised that 
 
23 Note, Teaching Inequality: The Problem of Public School Tracking, 102 HARV. 
L. REV. 1318, 1321 (1989). 
24 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
25 Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 209 (1849). 
26 Id. at 208 (emphasis added); see also Note, supra note 23. 
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discretion “reasonably” and there was no showing that it had 
“abused” its authority, its decision that separation on the basis of 
race was “adapted” to the students’ “general proficienc[ies]” was 
not open to further judicial scrutiny.27 
Later, in People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, the New York 
Court of Appeals drew on the principle of school authority 
discretion when it upheld Brooklyn’s racially segregated school 
system against an Equal Protection challenge.28  The court 
explicitly based its holding on the idea that “[a] natural 
distinction exists between the[] races,”29 noting that “legislation 
which recognizes th[ose] distinction[s] and provides for the 
peculiar wants or conditions of the particular race can in no just 
sense be called a discrimination.”30  In discussing the “natural 
distinction[s]” between the races, the court was not commenting 
merely on skin color; rather, the court was noting the well-
accepted notion that students of color were intellectually inferior 
to Anglo-Saxon white students.31  By condoning racial 
segregation, then, these early cases were implicitly condoning the 
separation of students into different schools on the basis of 
perceived ability.32 
These notions of innate racial inferiority and superiority 
coincided with the invention of the first intelligence test, which 
led to the formal adoption of racialized-ability grouping.33  Alfred 
Binet developed the first intelligence test in France in 1904 as a 
way “to identify ‘children whose poor performance indicated a 
need for special education.’ ”34  Although Binet’s purpose was to 
use the test to measure achievement,35 “testing was quickly 
adopted by scientists in the United States who believed the tests  
 
 
27 Roberts, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 208, 209 (“The committee, apparently upon 
great deliberation, have come to the conclusion, that the good of both classes of 
schools will be best promoted, by maintaining the separate primary schools for 
colored and for white children, and we can perceive no ground to doubt, that this is 
the honest result of their experience and judgment.”). 
28 See People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 441–42, 445, 450 (1883). 
29 Id. at 450 (emphasis added). 
30 Id. 
31 See id.; see also Note, supra note 23. 
32 Gallagher, 93 N.Y. at 450; Note, supra note 23. 
33 Note, supra note 23, at 1322. 
34 Id. (quoting STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 152 (1981)). 
35 See id. 
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could measure innate intelligence.”36  Thus, the American 
scientists who imported IQ tests erroneously conflated academic 
performance with innate intelligence.37 
It is in this historical context that the results of such exams 
began to be used to create a coherent educational system based 
on ability and stratified by race.38  Lewis Terman, the man 
credited with importing the use of IQ testing to America, “urg[ed] 
the use of ability grouping to keep certain ethnic groups 
separated from Anglo-Americans in school.”39  This promotion of 
testing as a means to identify innate abilities led to a significant 
shift in the way students were organized in schools, as school 
authorities “beg[a]n sorting students into separate tracks based 
on initial assessments of their capacity to learn.”40  The concept of 
academic tracking was therefore born of the belief that races of 
people were biologically distinct groups with differing innate 
ability levels and that they should be separated in schools 
accordingly.41 
Moreover, in establishing ability grouping, assumptions were 
made not only about students’ innate abilities to learn, but also 
about where those “natural” capabilities positioned them in the 
larger economic and social hierarchy of American society.42  
Proponents of academic tracking believed that students’ 
 
36 See id. 
37 Id. 
38 Daniel J. Losen, Note, Silent Segregation in Our Nation’s Schools, 34 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 517, 520 (1999). 
39 Id. at 521; see also R.C. Lewontin et al., IQ: The Rank Ordering of the World, 
in THE “RACIAL” ECONOMY OF SCIENCE: TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE 142, 144 
(Sandra Harding ed., 1993) (quoting Lewis Terman as writing that “[c]hildren of 
[Spanish-Indian, Mexican, and negro families] should be segregated into special 
classes. . . . They cannot master abstractions, but they can often be made efficient 
workers. . . .  There is no possibility at present of convincing society that they should 
not be allowed to reproduce, although from a eugenic point of view they constitute a 
grave problem because of their unusually prolific breeding”). 
40 Note, supra note 23, at 1322 (“Testing experts did not seriously consider the 
possibility that differences between racial groups might be the result of 
environmental factors or cultural bias in the tests. Instead, accepting the 
widespread assumption that native whites were at the top of society because of their 
superior racial stock, they interpreted test results as reflecting innate capacity.”). 
41 See id. 
42 Dickens, supra note 13, at 471. In the early twentieth century the goal of 
education was to prepare students “to assume different roles in the socioeconomic 
hierarchy,” and tracking was seen as preparing students for occupations tailored to 
their “innate ability to learn.” Id. 
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occupational choices were limited by their “innate” abilities.43  
“They explicitly rejected an alternative vision of education 
premised on the belief that all students had the potential to 
comprehend material necessary to pursue higher education.”44  
Thus, embedded in the very foundation of the tracking system is 
the premise that only those “high-ability” students should be 
educated for the purpose of attending post-secondary schools, 
while “low-ability” students need only be prepared for vocational 
occupations.45 
The education of black children was explicitly geared 
towards vocations under this system.46  Remedial and vocational 
education was considered most appropriate for minorities and 
immigrants, while college preparatory courses were considered 
appropriate for Anglo-American whites.47  In this way, early 
proponents of academic tracking created it with the express 
intent to stratify economically based on racialized notions of 
ability, which paralleled what contemporary science viewed as 
the “natural” positions of the races.48 
Thus, from the inception of the system, tracking has been a 
racialized practice.49  But rather than being consciously viewed 
as oppressive by those who instituted tracking systems, the 
racial undertones were seen as resulting from the “innate 
inferiority” of black children and were perceived to adhere to the 
natural racial order.50  These assumptions about racial hierarchy 
informed the very structure of ability grouping, and these notions 
of “racial inferiority” became embedded in the system itself.51 
 
43 Id. 
44 Note, supra note 23, at 1327–28. 
45 Dickens, supra note 13, at 471 (acknowledging that “advanced placement 
classes prepared students for college and careers that required specialized 
professional training,” while “[r]emedial and vocational programs prepared students 
for low-skill jobs or for technical training”). 
46 Terry Kershaw, The Effects of Educational Tracking on the Social Mobility of 
African Americans, 23 J. BLACK STUD. 152, 157 (1992). 
47 Dickens, supra note 13. 
48 See Note, supra note 23, at 1322–23. 
49 See Dickens, supra note 13, at 473. 
50 See Note, supra note 23, at 1322–23. 
51 See Dickens, supra note 13. 
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B. Tracking: Death and Resurrection 
Despite massive initial support, tracking began to fall out of 
widespread use after the 1930s.52  Interest in academic tracking 
diminished in light of studies “indicat[ing] grouping by ability 
had little or no effect on achievement gains.”53  As research 
demonstrating that “low placements could have negative effects 
on students” gained credibility between the mid-1930s to mid-
1950s, the use of tracking declined—but only for a brief period.54 
Academic tracking was reintroduced on a mass scale in 
direct response to the changing legal status of race-relations in 
the United States in the mid-1950s.  In 1954, Brown v. Board of 
Education ruled the doctrine of “separate but equal” 
unconstitutional in the public school setting.55  Following the 
Supreme Court’s ruling, academic tracking again increased 
dramatically.56  The resurgence of academic tracking minimized 
the effects of integration and continued to keep Anglo-American 
white students and students of color separate.57 
Moreover, there is evidence indicating that tracking was 
intentionally used as a segregative tool.  The belief that students 
of color had inferior innate intellectual abilities persisted into the 
1960s.58  In fact, the belief was so strongly held that legislators in 
at least one state considered passing a resolution “that would 
support a contention that Negroes are inferior to whites in innate 
ability and that therefore segregation is scientifically 
supportable.”59  Another state made the study of a book teaching 
 
52 Losen, supra note 38, at 521. 
53 Id. 
54 Note, supra note 23, at 1323. 
55 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); Dickens, supra 
note 13, at 472. 
56 Dickens, supra note 13, at 472 (noting that “[t]he Brown decision is directly 
correlated with the re-introduction of tracking as a system of academic 
classification”); Losen, supra note 38, at 521. 
57 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 457 (D.D.C. 1967), aff’d sub nom. Smuck 
v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see McNeal v. Tate Cnty. Sch. Dist., 508 
F.2d 1017, 101819 (5th Cir. 1975). In the South, tracking was used “as a means of 
circumventing court-ordered desegregation,” Losen, supra note 38, at 521, while in 
the North, tracking was used in response to demographic changes that resulted in 
increasing minority student populations, particularly in large urban centers, Note, 
supra note 23, at 1323. 
58 See Joseph A. Loftus, Virginia Debates Negro Abilities: Legislature To Vote on 
Book Branding Race Inferior, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1962, at 62. See generally 
CARLETON PUTNAM, RACE AND REASON: A YANKEE VIEW (1961). 
59 Loftus, supra note 58. 
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racial inferiority compulsory in its state schools.60  That those 
notions of racialized-ability were part of the mainstream anti-
integration discourse at the same time that tracking was being 
reintroduced calls into serious question the race-neutrality of 
tracking’s resurgence.  Because tracking’s proponents believed so 
strongly that ability differs by race, their racial intentions in 
separating by ability are clear. 
Nor has the discourse on racialized-ability disappeared from 
the American mainstream.61  Rather, it has simply shifted form.62  
Perhaps nowhere are racialized conceptions of ability more 
evident than in those diverse communities that have attempted 
to detrack,63 where the parents of white, upper-track students 
almost invariably challenge educators’ attempts to detrack on the 
grounds that increasing diversity will negatively impact 
academic rigor.64  As one educator put it, “statements that 
contain racial or class biases will be coded, but everyone in the 
room will know what is being said and what is feared.”65  
Community members may juxtapose “minority students” with 
“high achieving students,” as though the two terms are mutually 
exclusive.66  Or they may use racially neutral terms, like “some,” 
“other,” or “demographics,” to make implications that are 
nonetheless racialized in context.67  Other times, they will 
 
60 Id. 
61 OAKES, supra note 12, at 272 (finding that “[s]tereotypical views of minority 
students’ ability and motivation for academic work . . . remained salient in schools 
and communities”). 
62 As late as 1994, the authors of The Bell Curve explicitly argued that ability is 
inherited and racially distributed. See generally RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES 
A. MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN 
LIFE (1994). While such blatantly racialized arguments have become less socially 
acceptable, the book’s widespread readership demonstrates that support for notions 
of racialized-ability have not disappeared from the American consciousness. The Bell 
Curve was a New York Times Best Seller for at least fourteen weeks. The New York 
Times Book Review: Best Sellers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1995, at BR26. 
63 “Detracking” refers to the process of eliminating tracking from schools. See 
BURRIS & GARRITY, supra note 8, at viii. 
64 OAKES, supra note 12, at 287; see also Rusty Reeves, Deleveling Doesn’t 
Narrow Racial Lines, NEWS-REC., Jan. 12, 2012, at 5 (commenting that “[w]ith 
deleveling, we are lowering educational standards”). 
65 BURRIS & GARRITY, supra note 8, at 62. 
66 See, e.g., Reeves, supra note 64 (“[The district superintendent] says we have 
an educational ‘debt’ to pay black children. The high achieving children will pay that 
debt.”) (emphasis added). 
67 See, e.g., OAKES, supra note 12, at 273 (recounting one educator’s comment 
that “[w]e’re getting fewer honors kids, and that’s just demographics”). 
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suggest that diversity—while a laudable goal—is incompatible 
with excellence.68  Community members opposed to tracking 
frequently claim that different cultural backgrounds and 
differing abilities are responsible for the disproportionate 
numbers of minority students in lower tracks,69 and that these 
factors are “outside the purview of the school.”70 
Yet the research consistently shows that tracking itself 
significantly contributes to the racialized-achievement gap.  In 
fact, districts that have detracked have dramatically narrowed 
the achievement gap between white and minority students in 
their districts.71  And research in districts that continue to track 
has demonstrated that—even in the present day—race, and not 
ability or achievement, is often the defining factor in track 
placement.72  So why, in the twenty-first century, do schools 
continue to track, despite such evidence?  One junior high school 
teacher put it this way:  “Quite frankly, I think the reason we 
have honors is parental pressure.  It’s a racial issue.  An honors 
group is a white group.”73 
The current legal status of academic tracking cannot be 
analyzed in a vacuum.  Rather, it must be analyzed in light of its 
history and with reference to the beliefs about racialized-ability 
that motivated—and continue to motivate—its use.  This brief 
history of academic tracking, then, illustrates two key points: 
(1) for at least the first fifty years of its existence, the use of 
academic tracking rested on explicit assumptions about 
racialized-ability—assumptions that continue to pervade 
American racial discourse; and, (2) the use of academic tracking, 
both at its birth and at its resurrection, was intimately connected 
with the use of racial segregation. 
 
68 See Kevin Thompson, Deleveling, Think Globally Before Acting Locally, 
NEWS-REC., Jan. 19, 2012, at 4 (“Celebrating our diversity at the expense of our 
competitiveness will doom our kids to frustration and failure. Now, more than ever, 
we need to challenge each student to the limits of his or her abilities . . . .”) (emphasis 
added). 
69 BURRIS & GARRITY, supra note 8, at 20. 
70 Thompson, supra note 68 (“Yes, there are achievement-gap issues that need 
to be addressed. However, many of these stem from a variety of factors that are 
outside the purview of the school.”). 
71 See BURRIS & GARRITY, supra note 8, at 12–13. 
72 OAKES, supra note 12, at 233 (finding that in three different school districts, 
“African American and Latino students were more likely than their white and Asian 
peers with the same test scores to be placed in low-track classes”). 
73 Id. at 266. 
FINAL_KASTEN 12/11/2013 3:42 PM 
2013] MODERN DAY SCHOOL SEGREGATION 211 
II. EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES TO TRACKING 
This Part analyzes the Equal Protection challenges that 
have been made to the practice of academic tracking.  Section A 
gives a brief overview of Supreme Court Equal Protection 
doctrine.  Section B then examines the Supreme Court’s 
approach to Equal Protection claims in the context of education 
generally.  Finally, Section C examines the way Equal Protection 
doctrine has been applied in a number of tracking cases. 
A. Supreme Court Equal Protection Doctrine 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution states, in pertinent part: “No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”74  
The Equal Protection Clause’s basic guarantee is that “all 
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.”75  
However, courts recognize that not all state classifications are 
constitutionally inappropriate, and they generally give states 
broad discretion to determine who is and who is not “similarly 
circumstanced.”76  Thus, for most types of state action, the 
Supreme Court has held that the state need only show that the 
challenged classification “rationally furthers a legitimate state 
purpose.”77  This relatively deferential standard78 is known as 
“rational-basis review.”79 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court will not extend this level of 
deference to the states where certain types of classifications are 
involved.80  Rather, it has subjected “those classifications that 
disadvantage a ‘suspect class,’ or that impinge upon the exercise 
of a ‘fundamental right’ ”81 to a heightened form of review known 
as strict scrutiny.82  Where state action does implicate either a 
“suspect class” or a “fundamental right,” the Court will “requir[e] 
 
74 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
75 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. 
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). 
76 See id. 
77 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973). 
78 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216. 
79 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
738 (2007). 
80 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216. 
81 Id. at 216–17. 
82 Id. at 217 n.15. 
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the State to demonstrate that its classification has been precisely 
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”83  The 
Court has reserved the title of “suspect class” for only those 
“discrete and insular”84 groups that “command extraordinary 
protection from the majoritarian political process.”85  Among 
others, the categories of “race,” “national origin,” and “alienage” 
have been deemed “suspect classes.”86  Similarly, the Court has 
limited those rights that can be classified as “fundamental” and 
therefore deserving of strict scrutiny.87  To determine whether an 
infringed right rises to the status of a “fundamental” right, the 
Court “look[s] to the Constitution to see if the right . . . has its 
source, explicitly or implicitly, therein.”88  The right to vote, the 
right to interstate travel, the right to procreate, and other rights 
of a “uniquely private nature” are among those that have been 
granted “fundamental rights” protection.89 
Generally, if the state action implicates neither a “suspect 
class” nor a “fundamental right,” the Court will apply rational 
basis review.90  Occasionally, however, the Court has 
acknowledged that certain state classifications, while not 
specifically affecting a “suspect class” nor impinging on a 
“fundamental right,” nonetheless implicate Equal Protection 
issues deserving of a level of scrutiny that exceeds mere rational 
review.91  Under this standard, referred to as “intermediate 
scrutiny,”92 the Court determines “whether [the classification at 
issue] may fairly be viewed as furthering a substantial interest of 
the State.”93  The Court subjects particular classifications to this 
standard to ensure that they “reflect[] a reasoned judgment 
consistent with the ideal of equal protection.”94  However, the 
 
83 Id. at 216–17. 
84 Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976). 
85 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); see also 
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n.14 (“Legislation imposing special disabilities upon groups 
disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond their control suggests the kind of ‘class 
or caste’ treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish.”); 
Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313. 
86 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 61. 
87 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217 n.15. 
88 Id. 
89 Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312 & n.3. 
90 See id. at 312–14. 
91 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217–18. 
92 Id. at 218 n.16 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
93 Id. at 217–18. 
94 Id. at 217. 
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Court rarely applies this level of scrutiny.95  Thus, in the vast 
majority of Equal Protection challenges where neither an 
acknowledged “suspect class” nor “fundamental right” is at issue, 
the Court will apply rational basis review. 
At least where Equal Protection challenges on the basis of 
race are concerned, the Supreme Court has drawn a distinction 
between de jure and de facto discrimination, adding yet another 
layer of inquiry to the analysis.96  Race is a “suspect class,” and a 
law that discriminates by race on its face will be subject to strict 
scrutiny.97  On the other hand, where a law is facially neutral, 
but nonetheless is alleged to have a disproportionate impact on 
individuals of a particular race, the law will not automatically be 
subject to strict scrutiny.98  While a facially neutral law still is 
not permitted “invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race,”99 
a disproportionate impact only presents a constitutional violation 
where it is the result of intentional state action.100  The plaintiffs 
in such a case bear the initial burden of establishing 
discriminatory intent.101  Once that burden is met, “the burden of 
proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of 
unconstitutional action.”102  Only if the state fails to successfully 
rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action will the Court 
apply strict scrutiny; where the state effectively rebuts the 
presumption, the Court will merely apply rational basis 
review.103 
B. Equal Protection in the Public Schools104 
In the context of public education, the Court’s Equal 
Protection analysis has been even more nuanced.  Since the 
Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Brown v. Board of 
 
95 See id. at 218 n.16. 
96 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240, 242 (1976). 
97 See id. at 242. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 241. 
100 See id. at 239. 
101 See id. at 240–41. 
102 Id. at 241 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)). 
103 See id. at 242, 246. 
104 This Note does not purport to offer an exhaustive analysis of either all 
education-related Equal Protection claims or even all issues within the cases 
discussed herein. This Note confines itself to analysis of those cases and issues that 
bear directly on race, ability, and education. Specifically, issues such as whether 
wealth constitutes a “suspect class” are beyond the scope of this Note. 
FINAL_KASTEN 12/11/2013 3:42 PM 
214 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:201   
Education,105 two distinct lines of cases have developed.  The first 
line of cases can generally be characterized as involving 
allegations of state- or district-imposed racial segregation.106  
This line is addressed in Subsection 1.  The second line of cases 
involves various allegations that a facially neutral state law or 
policy, while not resulting in segregation, is nonetheless 
constitutionally invalid because it denies some class of students 
equal protection of the laws.107  That line is discussed in 
Subsection 2.  Finally, Subsection 3 briefly emphasizes the 
distinction between those two lines of cases, as that distinction is 
critical to understanding both the current case law on academic 
tracking and the current legal critiques of academic tracking 
systems. 
For more than fifty years preceding the Court’s decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education, school systems throughout the 
country were explicitly segregated on the basis of race pursuant 
to the doctrine of “separate but equal.”108  According to that 
doctrine, states or school districts could operate segregated school 
systems so long as the facilities provided to black and white 
students were “equal.”109  In Brown I, the Court was faced for the 
first time with the question of whether separate educational 
facilities can ever actually be “equal”; in other words, the Court 
had to decide whether racial segregation in the public schools 
constitutes a per se violation of the Equal Protection Clause.110  
In the Court’s now-famous holding, Chief Justice Warren 
announced that it does: 
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 
‘separate but equal’ has no place.  Separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal.  Therefore, we hold that the  
 
 
 
105 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
106 See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 443 U.S. 526, 530 (1979); 
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 452 (1979); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
413 U.S. 189, 191 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 
5–6 (1971). 
107 See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 452 (1988); Plyler v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 
(1973). 
108 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 490–91; see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544–
46 (1896), overruled by Brown I, 347 U.S. 483. 
109 See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950). 
110 See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493. 
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plaintiffs and others similarly situated . . . are, by reason of the 
segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of 
the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.111 
This holding created the foundation for two distinct lines of 
Equal Protection cases in the public school context. 
1. The Supreme Court’s School Segregation Line 
The first line of cases followed directly from the Court’s 
explicit holding in Brown I—that is, that segregation constitutes 
a per se violation of Equal Protection.112  The legal implication of 
the Court’s holding for laws explicitly mandating segregation was 
obvious:  The laws were constitutionally invalid.113  However, 
cases in which school segregation was not imposed explicitly by 
law—but rather as the result of other, facially race-neutral, state 
or school district policies—quickly began to make their way up to 
the Supreme Court.114  Through these cases, the Court began to 
develop a doctrine under which to analyze at what point policies 
that create segregation-in-fact rise to the level of 
unconstitutional segregation-by-law. 
The first cases to reach the Supreme Court dealt with 
continuing segregation in school districts that had been explicitly 
segregated prior to Brown I.115  Pursuant to Brown II, such 
districts were under “an affirmative duty ‘to effectuate a 
transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system.’ ”116  
Immediately after Brown II, however, it was unclear whether 
that transition could be accomplished merely by abolishing laws 
requiring separate schools, or whether those districts were also 
required to take further steps to desegregate. 
 
111 Id. at 495. 
112 See id. 
113 See id. The companion case to Brown I, Bolling v. Sharpe, held federally 
imposed racial segregation unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment. Bolling v Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
114 See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 191 (1973) (alleging that 
school segregation was imposed through “the manipulation of student attendance 
zones, schoolsite selection and a neighborhood school policy”). 
115 See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 490–92. 
116 NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1045 (6th Cir. 1977) (quoting 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)). While Brown I declared 
segregation unconstitutional, Brown II, decided the following year, dealt with the 
issue of remedy. The Court’s decision in Brown II formed the foundation for the 
doctrine governing what obligations a district was under to desegregate once it had 
been found that the district operated a dual school system. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. 
(Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 298–301 (1955). 
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The Supreme Court articulated the extent of such a district’s 
obligation in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education.117  The specific issue in Swann was whether a facially 
neutral student assignment system118 that nonetheless resulted 
in segregated schools violated the district’s affirmative duty to 
desegregate.119  The Court held that the affirmative duty to 
desegregate does not require districts to achieve a precise racial 
balance.120  However, the Court did caution lower courts to 
scrutinize “racially neutral” assignment plans that result in 
segregated schools,121 because such plans could serve to 
perpetuate segregation through the “discriminatory location of 
school sites or [the] distortion of school size in order to achieve or 
maintain an artificial racial separation.”122  By acknowledging 
that a district’s affirmative duty to desegregate encompasses 
more than merely avoiding those laws which explicitly segregate 
on their face,123 the Court laid the foundation for what would 
become a key distinction: the difference between de jure and de 
facto segregation.124 
The Court built upon that proposition in Keyes v. School 
District No. 1.125  Keyes was distinct from the earlier 
desegregation cases in that the district at issue “ha[d] never been 
operated under a constitutional or statutory provision that 
mandated or permitted racial segregation in public education.”126  
Instead, the plaintiffs alleged that the School Board created and 
maintained a system of segregation by manipulating “student 
attendance zones, schoolsite selection and a neighborhood school 
policy.”127  Thus, the Court had to determine whether  
 
 
117 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971). 
118 A student assignment system is the process by which students in a district 
are assigned to particular schools. See id. at 28–29. 
119 Id. at 22. 
120 Id. at 24. 
121 Id. at 26. 
122 Id. at 28. 
123 See id. 
124 Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973). 
125 See id. at 208–09. 
126 Id. at 191. 
127 Id. A “neighborhood school policy” is one in which the school district sends 
children to schools in their neighborhood. These systems were often manipulated to 
maintain segregation by mapping the boundaries of the neighborhood schools along 
existing patterns of residential segregation. Id. at 211–12. 
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manipulation of race-neutral policies in a district that had never 
explicitly segregated by law could nonetheless constitute a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.128 
In answering that question, the Court articulated the 
distinction between de jure and de facto segregation.  The Court 
defined de jure segregation as “a current condition of segregation 
resulting from intentional state action directed specifically [at] 
the [segregated] schools”129 and “emphasize[d] that the 
differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called 
de facto segregation . . . is purpose or intent to segregate.”130  An 
Equal Protection violation only exists where plaintiffs can 
establish that the segregation complained of is the result of de 
jure, and not de facto, segregation.131 
Plaintiffs bear the initial burden of establishing that the 
segregated conditions result from intentional state action132 and 
not from actions “which are beyond the control of state 
officials.”133  To disprove intent after plaintiffs establish a prima 
facie case of de jure segregation,134 it is insufficient for the school 
district to merely “rely upon some allegedly logical, racially 
neutral explanation.”135  Moreover, a school district may not rely 
on the remoteness in time between the intent and the current 
existence of segregation.136  Rather, if the district’s actions “were 
to any degree motivated by segregative intent and the 
segregation resulting from those actions continues to exist, the 
fact of remoteness in time certainly does not make those actions 
any less ‘intentional.’ ”137  While it is true that eventually “the 
relationship between past segregative acts and present 
segregation may become [too] attenuated” to support a finding of 
 
128 See id. at 198. 
129 Id. at 205–06. 
130 Id. at 208. 
131 See Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 45–46 (2d Cir. 1975). 
132 See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 198. 
133 NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1045 (6th Cir. 1977). 
134 In Keyes, the Court acknowledged that “[i]n the context of racial segregation 
in public education” there are “a variety of situations in which ‘fairness’ and ‘policy’ 
require state authorities to bear the burden of explaining actions or conditions which 
appear to be racially motivated.” Keyes, 413 U.S. at 209. Thus, in certain situations, 
presumptions may provide the requisite prima facie showing of intent. Id. at 208. 
135 Id. at 210. 
136 Id. (“We reject any suggestion that remoteness in time has any relevance to 
the issue of intent.”). 
137 Id. at 210–11. 
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de jure segregation, the Court cautioned that the “connection 
between past segregative acts and present segregation may be 
present even when not apparent and that close examination is 
required before concluding that the connection does not exist.”138  
Thus, to rebut a presumption of segregative intent, the district 
must either affirmatively disprove that its actions were 
motivated by such intent or show “that its past segregative acts 
did not create or contribute to the current segregated condition” 
of the schools.139  After Keyes, the key issue in any desegregation 
case became whether the school authorities acted with the 
requisite intent to segregate. 
In the immediate wake of Keyes, the circuit courts of appeals 
attempted to develop a standard for precisely what a plaintiff 
must show in order to establish “intent.”  In United States v. 
School District of Omaha, the Eighth Circuit provided a 
significant clarification of what type of “intent” is segregative in 
nature: 
[T]he ‘intent’ which triggers a finding of unconstitutionality is 
not an intent to harm black students, but simply an intent to 
bring about or maintain segregated schools.  Thus, even if a 
school board believes that ‘separate but equal’ is superior for 
black children, that belief will not save the intentional 
segregation from a finding of unconstitutionality.140 
Thus, the Eighth Circuit made clear that in looking for intent, 
courts are not concerned with determining whether a district’s 
actions are malevolent or benign; they are interested only in 
whether or not intent to segregate motivated a district’s 
decision.141 
The circuit courts of appeals also began exploring methods 
by which such segregative intent could be established.  Drawing 
on the Supreme Court’s use of presumptions in Keyes,142 a 
number of circuit courts of appeals began to articulate a “natural 
and foreseeable consequences” presumption.  The presumption 
originated in Oliver v. Michigan State Board of Education, where 
the Sixth Circuit held that a presumption of segregative intent 
could be drawn where the plaintiffs can establish that 
 
138 Id. at 211. 
139 Id. 
140 United States v. Sch. Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530, 535 (8th Cir. 1975). 
141 See id. 
142 See supra note 134. 
FINAL_KASTEN 12/11/2013 3:42 PM 
2013] MODERN DAY SCHOOL SEGREGATION 219 
segregation is “the natural, probable, and foreseeable result of 
public officials’ action or inaction.”143  Other circuits soon adopted 
the Sixth Circuit’s use of such a presumption.144 
However, the use of the “natural and foreseeable 
consequences” presumption was quickly called into question in 
the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Washington v. 
Davis.145  There, the Court held that to establish the requisite 
intent for an Equal Protection violation where a facially neutral 
law is at issue, a plaintiff must do more than demonstrate that 
the law has a greater proportionate impact on one race than it 
does on another:  “Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but 
it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination 
forbidden by the Constitution.” 146  The Court also made clear 
that its holding applied to school desegregation cases.147  
Accordingly, the circuit courts of appeals began considering the 
implications of Washington v. Davis on the “natural, probable, 
and foreseeable” consequences presumption.148 
 
143 Oliver v. Mich. State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1974). 
144 See Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding 
that “a finding of de jure segregation may be based on actions taken, coupled with 
omissions made, by governmental authorities which have the natural and 
foreseeable consequence of causing educational segregation”); see also Sch. Dist. of 
Omaha, 521 F.2d at 535–36 (holding “that a presumption of segregative intent arises 
once it is established that school authorities have engaged in acts or omissions, the 
natural, probable and foreseeable consequence of which is to bring about or maintain 
segregation”). 
145 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 232 (1976). At issue in Washington v. 
Davis was “a qualifying test administered to applicants for positions as police 
officers.” Id. 
146 Id. at 242. An allegation of disproportionate impact, without a showing of 
discriminatory purpose, constitutes mere de facto segregation. See id. at 240. 
Nevertheless, the discriminatory racial purpose need not “be express or appear on 
the face of the statute.” Id. at 241. Rather, it will often be necessary to infer such a 
purpose “from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that 
the law bears more heavily on one race than another.” Id. at 242. Thus, while 
disproportionate impact alone will not suffice to establish an Equal Protection 
violation, it may, and often will, provide evidence of intent. Id. at 253 (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (“Frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be objective 
evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence describing the subjective 
state of mind of the actor. For normally the actor is presumed to have intended the 
natural consequences of his deeds. This is particularly true in the case of 
governmental action which is frequently the product of . . . mixed motivation.”). 
147 Id. at 240; see also Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990, 
990 (1976) (remanding a school desegregation case from the Fifth Circuit “for 
reconsideration in light of Washington v. Davis”). 
148 See, e.g., NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1046 (6th Cir. 
1977). 
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For instance, appellants in NAACP v. Lansing Board of 
Education claimed that the Supreme Court repudiated the 
“natural, probable, and foreseeable” presumption.149  The Sixth 
Circuit rejected the appellants’ contention.150  Rather, the Sixth 
Circuit explained that use of the presumption is entirely 
consistent with the holdings of Keyes and Davis,151 because the 
presumption does “not dispense with the requirement that 
segregative intent or purpose be proven.”152  It merely permits 
the required intent to “be inferred from acts and policies of school 
authorities which had the natural and foreseeable effect of 
producing segregated schools.”153  The Sixth Circuit interpreted 
such an inference to be entirely consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Washington v. Davis that “discriminatory 
purpose may often be inferred from the totality of [the] relevant 
facts.”154 
The Supreme Court itself reviewed the “foreseeable effects 
standard” two years later in two cases decided on the same day: 
Columbus Board of Education v. Penick155 and Dayton Board of 
Education v. Brinkman (Dayton II).156  In both cases, the Court 
affirmed that “proof of foreseeable consequences is one type of 
quite relevant evidence of racially discriminatory purpose.”157  
The Court did caution that foreseeability alone does not “make[] 
out a prima facie case” and will not “routinely shift[] the burden 
of persuasion to the defendants.”158  Nevertheless, the Court 
endorsed the use of such an inference in appropriate 
circumstances159:  “Adherence to a particular policy or practice, 
‘with full knowledge of the predictable effects of such adherence 
upon racial imbalance in a school system is one factor among 
many others which may be considered by a court in determining 
whether an inference of segregative intent should be drawn.’ ”160  
 
149 Id. at 1047. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)). 
155 443 U.S. 449, 464–65 (1979). 
156 443 U.S. 526, 536 n.9 (1979). 
157 Id.; see Columbus Bd. of Educ., 443 U.S. at 464. 
158 Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 536 n.9. 
159 See id.; Columbus Bd. of Educ., 443 U.S. at 464–65. 
160 Columbus Bd. of Educ., 443 U.S. at 465. Other evidence the Supreme Court 
considers relevant to intent includes: “[t]he historical background of the 
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Thus, although the Court emphasized that proof of foreseeability 
alone is insufficient,161 it retained the permissible inference of 
segregative intent where “the natural, probable, and foreseeable 
result of public officials’ action or inaction was an increase or 
maintenance of segregation.”162 
From these Supreme Court holdings has emerged a coherent 
doctrine governing allegations of public school segregation.  For 
there to be a constitutional remedy, a court must find that the 
segregation is the result of de jure, and not de facto, 
segregation.163  Plaintiffs bear the initial burden of establishing 
discriminatory intent.164  To make out a prima facie case of de 
jure segregation, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) action or inaction 
by public officials (2) with a segregative purpose (3) which 
actually results in increased or continued segregation in the 
public schools.”165  The essential differentiating factor between de 
jure and de facto segregation is “purpose or intent to 
segregate.”166 
Plaintiffs need not establish that segregation was the sole 
purpose of the state action; they need only show that segregative 
intent or purpose “has been a motivating factor in the 
decision.”167  Moreover, the segregative purpose need not “be 
express or appear on the face of the statute.”168  Rather, it is 
permissible to infer such a purpose “from the totality of the 
relevant facts.”169  While neither disparate impact nor foreseeable 
consequences—nor both—are alone sufficient to establish an 
 
decision . . . particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious 
purposes”; “[t]he specific sequence of events leading up [sic] the challenged decision”; 
“[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence”; “[s]ubstantive 
departures . . . particularly if the factors usually considered important by the 
decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached”; and 
“legislative or administrative history.” Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. 
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1977). These factors are not “exhaustive,” 
however. Id. at 268. 
161 See Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 536 n.9. 
162 See Alexander v. Youngstown Bd. of Educ., 675 F.2d 787, 793 (6th Cir. 1982). 
163 See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209–11 (1973). 
164 Id. at 208. 
165 NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1046 (6th Cir. 1977); see 
Alexander, 675 F.2d at 791. 
166 Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208. 
167 See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–
66 (1977). 
168 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976). 
169 Id. at 242. 
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Equal Protection violation, they are nonetheless important 
considerations from which a court may infer segregative intent.170  
Once the plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case of 
unconstitutional de jure segregation, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to either affirmatively disprove segregative intent or 
demonstrate “that its past segregative acts did not create or 
contribute to the current segregated condition.”171 
2. The “Importance of Education” Line 
At the same time that the school desegregation cases were 
developing, the Supreme Court was simultaneously deciding a 
second, distinct line of cases alleging Equal Protection violations 
in the public schools.  These cases were not alleging conditions of 
racial segregation; rather, they alleged that various state actions 
otherwise impinged a fundamental right or disadvantaged a 
suspect class.172  The early cases in this line were based, at least 
in part, on the proposition that the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Brown I recognized education as a “fundamental right.”173 
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 
however, the Court rejected the proposition that education is a 
“fundamental right.”174  At issue in San Antonio was a school-
financing system that plaintiffs alleged deprived those in 
relatively poorer school districts of Equal Protection of the 
laws.175  The Court analyzed the issue by determining whether 
the financing system disadvantaged a suspect class or impinged 
a fundamental right.176  The Court answered both questions in 
the negative.177 
 
 
170 See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979). 
171 Keyes, 413 U.S. at 211. 
172 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). 
173 Id. at 29. There was a great deal of strong language in Brown I that seemed 
to support that contention. See Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“In these days, it 
is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is 
denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has 
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal 
terms.” (emphasis added)). 
174 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 37. 
175 Id. at 19–20. 
176 Id. at 18. 
177 Id. 
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Although the Court did reaffirm its “historic dedication to 
public education”178 and acknowledge “the vital role of education 
in a free society,”179 it nevertheless held that “the importance of a 
service performed by the State does not determine whether it 
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination 
under the Equal Protection Clause.”180  Instead, the Court held 
that the only relevant determination in deciding whether 
education was a fundamental right was “whether there is a right 
to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the 
Constitution.”181  The Court answered this question in the 
negative, holding that—at least in the context of this case—
education was not a fundamental right.182 
The next school Equal Protection case to address the 
fundamental right paradigm was Plyler v. Doe.183  The issue in 
that case was whether a Texas law barring un-documented 
immigrant children from receiving a free public education—when 
children who are United States citizens and children who are 
legally admitted immigrants were provided such an education—
violated the Equal Protection Clause.184  The Court reaffirmed its 
holding in San Antonio that public education is not a 
fundamental right, yet the Court also went to great lengths to 
emphasize the importance of a public education.185  Because 
“education provides the basic tools by which individuals might 
lead economically productive lives to the benefit of [the Nation],” 
the Court took the position that it “cannot ignore the significant 
social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied 
the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social 
 
178 Id. at 30. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 33. 
182 Id. at 36–37. While the Court refused to assign education “fundamental 
rights” status in and of itself, it did acknowledge that where a state deprives a child 
of educational opportunities and that deprivation, in turn, threatens to deprive that 
child of his or her effective exercise of other, recognized fundamental rights, an 
Equal Protection violation may exist. Id. at 37 (suggesting that “an interference with 
fundamental rights” may arise if a district were to “fail[] to provide each child with 
an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the 
rights of speech and of full participation in the political process”). 
183 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215–17 (1982). 
184 Id. at 205. 
185 Id. at 221 (explaining that education is not “merely some governmental 
‘benefit’ indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation”). 
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order rests.”186  Thus, while public education is not a 
“fundamental right,” the total deprivation of a public education 
nonetheless presents “recurring constitutional difficulties.”187  
Therefore—even in the absence of either a suspect class or a 
fundamental right188—the Court found that the nature of the 
deprivation189 required application of intermediate scrutiny.190 
In Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, however, the 
Supreme Court carefully limited its holding in Plyler to the 
“unique circumstances” of that case.191  In Kadrmas, plaintiffs 
alleged that a state law permitting “some local school boards, but 
not others, to assess a fee for transporting pupils between their 
homes and the public schools”192 violated Equal Protection.193  
The Supreme Court rejected their claim,194 disposing of “the 
proposition that education is a ‘fundamental right’ ” or should 
otherwise be subjected to heightened scrutiny.195 
This line of cases, therefore, follows the typical approach in 
most Equal Protection claims.196  The Court first must decide 
what level of scrutiny it will apply to the alleged violation at 
issue.197  In order for the Court to subject a state classification to 
strict scrutiny, either a “suspect class” or a “fundamental right” 
must be implicated.198  Otherwise, with very rare exceptions,199 
mere rational basis review will be applied.200  Because the 
Supreme Court rejected the contention that education is a 
 
186 Id. 
187 See id. at 217, 221. 
188 Id. at 223 (“Undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class 
because their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a 
‘constitutional irrelevancy.’ ”). 
189 Id. (“[The law at issue] imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of 
children not accountable for their disabling status. The stigma of illiteracy will mark 
them for the rest of their lives. By denying these children a basic education, we deny 
them the ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose 
any realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest way to the 
progress of our Nation.”). 
190 See id. at 224. 
191 Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988). 
192 Id. at 452. 
193 Id. at 455–56. 
194 Id. at 452. 
195 Id. at 458. 
196 See supra Part II.A. 
197 See Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 457–58. 
198 See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. 
199 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–18 (1982); see Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 459. 
200 See Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 457–58. 
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“fundamental right,”201 the fact that a discrimination or a 
disparate impact occurs in the context of the public schools will 
not automatically entitle a plaintiff to strict scrutiny.202  Rather, 
courts must address the classification at issue in each individual 
case to determine whether it rises to the level of a suspect class 
or a classification otherwise deserving of heightened protection.203 
3. Clarifying the Distinction 
What should be clear from this discussion is that the above 
Supreme Court Equal Protection doctrines govern distinctly 
different cases.  While the approach taken in San Antonio, Plyler, 
and Kadrmas is broadly applicable to a variety of Equal 
Protection violations,204 whether based on race or not, the more 
specific approach taken in the desegregation cases is applicable 
only in those situations where a condition of school segregation is 
alleged.205  Because the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown I 
declared de jure segregation in public schools per se 
unconstitutional, the inquiry in segregation cases focuses not on 
levels of scrutiny or fundamental rights, but merely on whether a 
condition of unconstitutional de jure segregation exists.206 
C. Equal Protection and Academic Tracking 
The Supreme Court has never granted a petition for 
certiorari to hear an Equal Protection challenge to the practice of 
academic tracking.  However, since the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Brown I,207 several circuit courts of appeals have had the 
opportunity to consider whether academic tracking constitutes 
an Equal Protection violation.208  Several legal scholars have also 
addressed the issue of academic tracking and proposed solutions 
 
201 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973). 
202 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223–24. 
203 See generally Kadrmas, 487 U.S. 450 (disparity in school fees); Plyler, 457 
U.S. 202 (legal status and education); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. 1 
(wealth and education). 
204 See generally Kadrmas, 487 U.S. 450 (alleging inequality in school fees); 
Plyler, 457 U.S. 202 (alleging discrimination based on legal status); San Antonio 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. 1 (alleging wealth discrimination). 
205 See supra notes 163–71 and accompanying text. 
206 See supra Part II.B.1. 
207 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
208 See generally Ga. State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 
F.2d 1403 (11th Cir. 1985); McNeal v. Tate Cnty. Sch. Dist., 508 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 
1975); Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
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to address the legal implications involved.209  Subsection 1 
explains the various court decisions on academic tracking, while 
Subsection 2 outlines the solutions proposed by various 
commentators.  Finally, Subsection 3 illustrates why both the 
legal and scholarly approaches are insufficient. 
1. Existing Court Decisions on Academic Tracking 
The existing approach to deciding academic tracking cases 
has by no means been consistent.  The earliest circuit to address 
tracking was the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 
Smuck v. Hobson.  In that case, the court of appeals upheld a 
district court ruling ordering the Washington, D.C. schools to 
abolish the practice of academic tracking.210  The district court 
drew a distinction between de jure and de facto segregation,211 
defining de jure segregation as “segregation specifically 
mandated by law or by public policy pursued under color of 
law”212 and describing de facto segregation as resulting “from the 
action of pupil assignment policies not based on race but upon 
social or other conditions for which government cannot be held 
responsible.”213  The district court rejected the contention that 
ability grouping was a form of de jure racial segregation214 and 
analyzed the constitutionality of academic tracking under 
rational basis review.215 
However, even under this permissive standard, the court 
found tracking to be unconstitutional.216  The court acknowledged 
the government’s discretion to classify individuals, but asserted 
that a government classification can only be upheld where “those 
included within or excluded from the respective classes [are] 
those for whom the inclusion or exclusion is appropriate.”217  
Thus, the court reasoned, “the track system is fatally 
defective,”218 not because it purposefully discriminates on the 
 
209 See generally Dickens, supra note 13; Losen, supra note 38; Note, supra note 
23. 
210 Smuck, 408 F.2d at 189. 
211 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 493 (D.D.C. 1967), aff’d sub nom. 
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 See id. at 512 n.208. 
215 Id. at 511. 
216 Id. at 513. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
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basis of race, but “because for many students placement is based 
on traits other than those on which the classification purports to 
be based.”219 
While the district court case in Hobson is perhaps one of the 
most cited academic tracking cases, its approach to academic 
tracking has not been followed by later courts.  Rather, it was the 
Fifth Circuit, in McNeal v. Tate County School District, that 
developed perhaps the most commonly followed approach.220  
Faced with an academic tracking system in a formerly dual 
school district, the court held that “[a]bility grouping, like any 
other non-racial method of student assignment, is not 
constitutionally forbidden.”221  The court expressed concern with 
substituting its judgment for that of educators regarding the 
advantages and disadvantages of tracking, and therefore decided 
that educators “ought to be, and are, free to use such grouping 
whenever it does not have a racially discriminatory effect.”222  
Even if ability grouping does cause segregation, it “may 
nevertheless be permitted in an otherwise unitary system if the 
school district can demonstrate that its assignment method is not 
based on the present results of past segregation or will remedy 
such results through better educational opportunities.”223  Thus, 
the Fifth Circuit’s approach permits tracking in any “otherwise 
unitary system”—no matter what degree of segregation it 
creates—so long as the segregative result is either: (1) not the 
result of other de jure segregation; or (2) being used for the 
benign purpose of remedying past de jure segregation.224 
Since the Fifth Circuit’s decision in McNeal, other circuit 
courts of appeals have adopted, and elaborated on, the “McNeal 
standard” in academic tracking cases.225  For example, the 
 
219 Id. The court went on to state: “[R]ather than being classified according to 
ability to learn, these students are in reality being classified according to their 
socioeconomic or racial status, or—more precisely—according to environmental and 
psychological factors which have nothing to do with innate ability.” Id. at 514. 
220 McNeal v. Tate Cnty. Sch. Dist., 508 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1975). 
221 Id. at 1020. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 See id. 
225 Ga. State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1414 
(11th Cir. 1985) (quoting McNeal, 508 F.2d at 1020) (“This circuit’s precedent 
establishes that, despite any resulting numerical racial disproportionality, 
achievement grouping is permissible in a school district that has not been declared 
fully unitary ‘if the school district can demonstrate that its assignment method is 
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Eleventh Circuit makes it even clearer that the “McNeal 
standard” will permit any degree of racial segregation caused by 
ability grouping so long as one of the two McNeal factors is 
met.226  After finding the factors satisfied in that case, the court 
nonetheless openly acknowledged that “the racial disparity in the 
local defendants’ lower achievement groups is substantial.”227  
Despite this significant degree of segregation, the Eleventh 
Circuit found that such segregative effects were permissible 
because of the district court’s factual finding that “the ability 
grouping schemes will remedy the consequences of prior 
segregation.”228 
The approach taken by the District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois in People Who Care v. Rockford Board of 
Education229 stands in stark contrast to the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits’ approach.  There, the plaintiffs alleged that actions by 
their school district, including the implementation of an 
academic tracking system, created an unconstitutional condition 
of de jure segregation.230  Rather than apply the McNeal 
standard, the district court applied the Supreme Court’s school 
segregation doctrine.231 
Thus, the district court’s inquiry focused on whether “the 
governmental authorities created or maintained racial 
segregation in the schools” and whether “their actions were 
motivated by segregative intent.”232  The court cautioned that 
“segregative intent should not be confused with evil motive” and 
emphasized that “the required intent is simply the intent to keep 
the races separate.”233  The court explained that “conduct 
motivated by such intent is actionable even when there is no 
 
not based on the present results of past segregation or will remedy such results 
through better educational opportunities.’ ”). 
226 See id. at 1414–15. 
227 Id. at 1414 n.14. 
228 Id. at 1416. The Eleventh Circuit has continued to adhere to the McNeal 
standard, reaffirming it as recently as 2007 in its decision in Holton v. City of 
Thomasville School District and expressly rejecting the district court’s analysis of 
“whether the ability-grouping program was intentionally discriminatory.” Holton v. 
City of Thomasville Sch. Dist. (Holton II), 490 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007); see 
also Holton v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist. (Holton I), 425 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11th 
Cir. 2005). 
229 851 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
230 Id. at 908, 910, 922–23. 
231 See id. at 930–31. 
232 Id. at 931. 
233 Id. at 932. 
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desire to inflict educational harm upon any racial group.”234  In 
applying this approach, the district court found that “a pattern of 
facts and circumstances occurring over a long period of time 
clearly supports a finding of intentional conduct.”235  That 
tracking creates intra-school, rather than inter-school 
segregation, is of no consequence:  Both violate the Constitution 
equally.236  In fact, the court observed that “[s]uch internal 
segregation may even be more invidious because its effects are 
observable to the students every school day.”237 
The Seventh Circuit did not review the district court’s 
determination of liability.238  It did, however, have the 
opportunity to review the district court’s order of remedy in 
People Who Care v. Rockford Board of Education.239  In dicta from 
that opinion, Judge Posner seems to reluctantly agree that, were 
tracking “adopted in order to segregate the races,” tracking 
would present an Equal Protection violation for which a remedy 
would be available.240  Because a constitutional remedy is only 
available where de jure segregation has been found,241 the 
implication of Judge Posner’s statement is that where tracking is 
implemented with a segregative purpose, it would constitute de 
jure segregation.242  He therefore implicitly condones the district 
court’s reasoning on liability.243 
Clearly, the McNeal standard and the approach taken by the 
district court in People Who Care represent two distinct methods 
of analyzing academic tracking cases.  Because the Supreme 
 
234 Id. 
235 Id. Among the “pattern of facts and circumstances” that supported an 
inference of segregative intent was the district court’s finding that “tracking of 
students by race into various educational programs” occurred in the school district at 
issue. Id. at 933. 
236 Id. at 917 (“Within school segregation by intentional conduct is the same as 
intentional conduct resulting in systemwide segregation. This internal segregation is 
unlawful.”); see also Reed v. Rhodes, 607 F.2d 714, 731 (6th Cir. 1979); Hobson v. 
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 511–13, 512 n.208 (D.D.C. 1967), aff’d sub nom. Smuck v. 
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
237 People Who Care, 851 F. Supp. at 917; see also Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd., 383 F. 
Supp. 699, 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d sub nom. Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 512 
F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975). 
238 People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 532–33 (7th Cir. 
1997). 
239 Id. 
240 Id. at 536. 
241 See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208–09 (1973). 
242 See People Who Care, 111 F.3d at 536. 
243 However, because that statement was dicta, it is not controlling. 
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Court itself has never decided the issue, the circuit courts of 
appeals remain free to adopt either approach, or to craft a new 
solution. 
2. Commentators’ Critiques of Academic Tracking 
Several commentators critical of academic tracking have 
attempted to develop legal analysis that would require its 
discontinued use.244  Such commentators have tended to take 
issue with the McNeal standard and to advocate for an analysis 
of tracking either as an Equal Protection violation or a violation 
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  For example, one 
commentator “questions the assumptions that underlie judicial 
tolerance of tracking.”245  The author criticizes existing legal 
approaches, such as the McNeal standard, as granting too much 
deference to the expertise of school officials,246 and takes issue 
with the “scientific basis” of tracking.247  But rather than ground 
his or her legal attack in the Equal Protection Clause, the author 
instead argues that “Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
provides one vehicle for challenging the widespread use of 
tracking.”248  Such a statutory challenge, the author argues, 
would require school authorities to “prove the educational 
necessity of tracking schemes that have a disproportionate 
impact on minorities.”249  A Title VI challenge would not require 
the plaintiff to establish intent and would subject tracking 
systems to “the kind of heightened scrutiny required by Title VI 
disparate impact analysis.”250  In the author’s view, given the 
lack of clear evidence demonstrating the benefits of academic 
tracking, schools likely would not be able to demonstrate that 
tracking is educationally necessary, and tracking would therefore 
not sustain a Title VI challenge.251 
 
 
244 See generally Dickens, supra note 13; Losen, supra note 38; Note, supra note 
23. 
245 Note, supra note 23, at 1319. 
246 See id. at 1327. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. at 1334 (footnote omitted). 
249 Id. 
250 Id. at 1340. 
251 Id. 
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On the other hand, others argue that academic tracking 
presents an Equal Protection violation.252  For example, Angelia 
Dickens argues that academic tracking should be 
unconstitutional “because education is fundamentally important 
and because tracking systems classify students based on race.”253  
Dickens suggests that the Court should adopt the “belief in the 
fundamentality of education” adopted by Justice Marshall in his 
dissent in San Antonio254 and further argues that tracking 
constitutes a classification based on race that should be subject to 
strict scrutiny.255  Thus, under Dickens’s formulation, a school 
district would be required to show that tracking is “narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”256  In the author’s 
view, a district will likely not be able to establish a compelling 
interest for tracking; and therefore, an Equal Protection 
challenge to tracking under her framework for strict scrutiny 
analysis would likely succeed.257 
3. Existing Approaches Are Insufficient 
Both the existing McNeal standard and the Equal Protection 
and statutory challenges proposed by commentators are 
insufficient methods for approaching a legal analysis of academic 
tracking systems.  The approach taken by the District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois in People Who Care258 comes far 
closer to providing an accurate analysis under existing Supreme 
Court precedent, though as will be demonstrated in Part III, a 
deeper look into both Supreme Court doctrine and the history of 
tracking has even broader implications than the holding in that 
case would suggest. 
The McNeal standard largely fails to abide by existing 
Supreme Court doctrine.259  Where an existing condition of 
segregation in violation of the Equal Protection clause is alleged, 
 
252 See, e.g., Dickens, supra note 13, at 482. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. at 485. 
255 Id. at 500. 
256 Id. 
257 See id. at 501. But see Losen, supra note 38, at 527–29 (arguing that under a 
scrutiny Equal Protection analysis, “only if facially neutral ability grouping practices 
achieved nearly total segregation would they trigger strict scrutiny review” and that, 
as a result, “most constitutional challenges are unlikely to succeed”). 
258 See supra notes 229–37 and accompanying text. 
259 See supra notes 163–71 and accompanying text. 
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the Supreme Court has expressly instructed courts to look for 
evidence of segregative intent as the defining characteristic of de 
jure segregation.260  Yet the McNeal standard requires courts to 
ignore the issue of segregative intent261 and look only to whether 
the segregative result is either (1) not the result of other de jure 
segregation or (2) being used for the benign purpose of remedying 
past de jure segregation.262  By requiring courts to analyze 
whether the segregative result is the effect of other, past de jure 
segregation, the McNeal standard forces the courts to bypass the 
critical question of whether an academic tracking system that 
causes segregative effects is itself a method of present-day de 
jure segregation that independently violates the Equal Protection 
Clause—that is, whether it was instituted with the purpose or 
intent to segregate.263  Moreover, the second prong of the McNeal 
standard—that an academic tracking system that creates a 
segregative result is acceptable so long as it is being used to 
remedy past de jure segregation—ignores the central holding of 
Brown I, which was that racial segregation, for whatever 
purpose, is inherently unequal and therefore per se 
unconstitutional.264  The Sixth Circuit put it simply:  
“Benevolence of motive does not excuse segregative acts.”265 
Similarly, the Title VI remedy suggested by one 
commentator, while potentially effective, does not go far enough.  
Academic tracking does not merely present a potential violation 
of Title VI; it also significantly encroaches on students’ Equal 
Protection rights when it is used in a way that creates intra-
school segregation.266  While a statutory remedy may  
 
 
 
260 Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205–06 (1973); see also supra notes 
163–71 and accompanying text. 
261 Holton II, 490 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Holton I, 425 F.3d 
1325, 1328 (11th Cir. 2005). 
262 McNeal v. Tate Cnty. Sch. Dist., 508 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1975). 
263 See supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
264 Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); see also United States v. Sch. Dist. of 
Omaha, 521 F.2d 530, 535 (8th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he ‘intent’ which triggers a finding of 
unconstitutionality is . . . simply an intent to bring about or maintain segregated 
schools. Thus, even if a school board believes that ‘separate but equal’ is superior for 
black children, that belief will not save the intentional segregation from a finding of 
unconstitutionality.”). 
265 Oliver v. Mich. State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 183 (6th Cir. 1974). 
266 See infra Part III. 
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undoubtedly be a useful tool for challenging academic tracking 
systems, an unconstitutional violation deserves a constitutionally 
guaranteed remedy. 
However, the constitutional remedy proposed by Dickens is 
not firmly anchored in existing Supreme Court doctrine.  While 
many legal scholars likely share the author’s sentiment that 
“Justice Marshall’s belief in the fundamentality of education is 
an idea courts should adopt,”267 that argument is foreclosed by 
the Supreme Court’s holding in San Antonio, which by now is 
firmly established.268  Perhaps more importantly, however, even 
if Dickens’s approach were to succeed, application of strict 
scrutiny would still permit academic tracking were the court to 
find that it is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest.”269  If, on the other hand, academic tracking is analyzed 
as—and found to constitute—a form of de jure segregation under 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Brown I, it would be per se 
unconstitutional. 
III. A DIFFERENT APPROACH: ACADEMIC TRACKING AS A DE JURE 
METHOD OF INTRA-SCHOOL SEGREGATION 
As set forth above, the line of cases from Brown I to 
Columbus and Dayton II, long ignored by scholars and courts, 
clearly demonstrates that academic tracking systems constitute a 
per se violation of Equal Protection270 in all instances where their 
use results in within school segregation—not merely in those 
individual districts with a history of segregation.271  To make out 
 
267 Dickens, supra note 13, at 485. 
268 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973). At this 
point, the doctrine is almost forty years old, and has been reaffirmed at least twice 
since it was decided. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988); 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982). 
269 Dickens, supra note 13, at 500. 
270 The constitutionality of academic tracking systems in exclusively one-race 
districts is beyond the scope of this Note. While the pedagogical value of academic 
tracking in any school system is questionable at best, the object of this Note is not to 
engage in debate over the system’s educational utility. Rather, this Note seeks to 
identify the racialized processes through which tracking systems perpetuate intra-
school racial segregation, and confines itself to legal analysis of the constitutional 
doctrines through which this modern day school segregation may be challenged. 
271 “Within school segregation” is defined, for purposes of this Note, as a 
condition that exists when the proportion of students of a particular race in a given 
academic track or level significantly differs from the proportion of students of that 
race within the academic grade. For instance, if, in a particular district, the seventh 
grade is comprised of forty percent white students and sixty percent black students, 
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such a prima facie case, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) action or 
inaction by public officials”; “(2) with a segregative purpose”; 
“(3) which actually results in increased or continued segregation 
in the public schools.”272  The contention that “academic tracking 
systems constitute a per se violation of Equal Protection in all 
instances where their use results in within school segregation”273 
quickly disposes of the third element.  By definition, where 
tracking systems do not “actually result[] in increased or 
continued segregation in the public schools,”274 no per se violation 
will be found. 
The first element—“action or inaction by public officials”275—
is similarly simple to establish.  The decision to use, or to 
continue to maintain, a system of academic tracking is 
unquestionably an “action or inaction by public officials.”276  The 
decision to newly implement an ability grouping system is clearly 
an action on the part of the school board.  Similarly, whether one 
characterizes the continued use of academic tracking as either 
“action” or “inaction,” the classification is of no consequence.  
This element is satisfied by either “action or inaction by public 
officials.”277  Thus, in every instance in which the use of an 
academic tracking system results in within school racial 
segregation, the first and third elements of a prima facie case of 
unconstitutional de jure segregation will be satisfied. 
That leaves only the second element, the distinguishing 
factor of any de jure segregation claim: “purpose or intent to 
segregate.”278  The disparate impact, foreseeable consequences, 
and unique racialized history of academic tracking provide ample 
evidence of segregative intent.  In fact, academic tracking 
 
each academic track should also be comprised of approximately sixty percent black 
students and forty percent white students. A significant departure from those 
proportions in any level would indicate a segregative tracking system. It is 
important to note that this requirement does not violate the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Washington v. Davis that mere disproportionate impact is insufficient to 
establish a prima facie case of de jure discrimination. This is so because the other 
elements of the proposed approach require a finding that segregative intent is 
inherent in systems of academic tracking. 
272 NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1046 (6th Cir. 1977); see 
supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
273 See supra text accompanying notes 270–71. 
274 Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d at 1046. 
275 Id. 
276 See id. 
277 Id. (emphasis added). 
278 Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973). 
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systems are so inherently racialized that their very use justifies a 
finding of segregative intent.  For any school district to 
(1) continue to use a system (2) that was established for the 
express purpose of separating students on the basis of race into 
distinct and unequal curriculums and (3) which continues to have 
a segregative effect is the very definition of de jure segregation.279  
To explain this point, it is helpful to go through the analysis step 
by step. 
First, Columbus held that while neither disparate impact 
nor foreseeable consequences are alone sufficient to establish an 
Equal Protection violation, they are nonetheless important 
considerations from which a court may infer segregative intent.280  
In any district where the use of an academic tracking system 
creates within school segregation, both factors will inevitably be 
present.  With regard to disproportionate impact, the 
disproportionate placement of black students in remedial and low 
educational tracks has been widely recognized.281  Moreover, the 
requirement that an academic tracking system “result in within 
school segregation” to be found a per se violation of Equal 
Protection ensures that in all cases under this approach, there 
will be a disproportionate impact.  The very definition of “within 
school segregation” adopted by this Note effectually requires that 
a disproportionate impact be present.282 
Similarly, segregation is a well-known “foreseeable 
consequence” of implementing academic tracking systems in 
diverse school districts.283  This is even more true of the decision 
 
279 See Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d at 1046 (“A finding of de jure segregation 
requires a showing of three elements: (1) action or inaction by public officials 
(2) with a segregative purpose (3) which actually results in increased or continued 
segregation in the public schools.”). Perhaps this Note’s most controversial 
contention is that academic tracking systems are so inherently racialized that, much 
like segregation itself, they cannot be used without segregative intent. To put it 
another way, there are enough common characteristics between academic tracking 
systems in any district where such systems produce racial segregation that “the 
totality of the relevant facts” in every such district will always create an inference of 
segregative intent. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
280 See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979). 
281 See Dickens, supra note 13, at 474; Losen, supra note 38, at 517; Note, supra 
note 23, at 1318. 
282 See supra note 271. 
283 See People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 536 (7th Cir. 
1997) (“The well-known correlation between race and academic performance makes 
tracking, even when implemented in accordance with strictly objective criteria, a 
pretty effective segregator.”). 
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to continue to use a system of academic tracking once it has been 
shown to have a segregative effect.  While evidence of the 
segregative effect of academic tracking is alone insufficient to 
establish that academic tracking systems constitute de jure 
segregation,284 a school board certainly cannot be heard to argue 
that it did not foresee the segregative effects of its continued use 
of academic tracking when segregation has already resulted from 
tracking in its district.  Again, the requirement that an academic 
tracking system “result in within school segregation” to 
constitute a per se Equal Protection violation ensures that in all 
cases covered by this approach, the district will, at the very least, 
be able to foresee the segregative effects of the continued use of 
academic tracking.  In this way, this approach ensures that every 
academic tracking system that constitutes a per se violation will 
involve both a disproportionate impact and a foreseeable 
segregative consequence. 
However, the inference of segregative intent does not rely on 
disproportionate impact and foreseeable consequences alone.  
Several other factors strongly support an inference of intent or 
purpose to segregate.  Perhaps most convincingly, “[t]he 
historical background of the decision”285 discloses an express 
intent to segregate on the basis of race.286  When academic 
tracking was first developed, its use was encouraged “to keep 
certain ethnic groups separated from Anglo-Americans in 
school.”287  Its purpose went beyond mere separation of the races, 
however; its explicit purpose was to prepare students of color for 
vocations by tracking them into remedial and vocational classes, 
while preparing white students for college by placing them in 
college preparatory tracks.288  Thus, the purpose of the initial 
tracking systems went beyond the doctrine of “separate but 
equal” invalidated in Brown I to establish separate and unequal 
educational tracks for black and white students.289 
 
 
 
284 Columbus Bd. of Educ., 443 U.S. at 464–65. 
285 See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 
(1977). 
286 See supra Part I. 
287 Losen, supra note 38, at 520–21. 
288 See supra Part I. 
289 See supra Part I. 
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An inference of segregative intent may fairly be drawn from 
the continued use of an educational system with such a highly 
racialized historical background,290 especially when racially coded 
language and racialized notions of ability continue to pervade 
detracking discourse today.291  The conveniently timed 
resurgence of academic tracking in the immediate post-Brown 
years292 further strengthens that inference.  Moreover, when one 
considers that the same criteria are used to track students today 
as were used at its inception, despite the well-documented and 
explicitly segregative purpose of the system at that time,293 it 
becomes clear that the segregative intent on which tracking 
systems were premised has become embedded in the operation of 
the system itself.294  Academic tracking was never a facially 
neutral practice;295 it was intended to segregate students when it 
was first developed, and it continues to segregate students in 
schools across the country today.296  Therefore, based on the 
above evidence of segregative intent, academic tracking systems 
that result in within school segregation constitute per se de jure 
segregation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
A finding of de jure segregation imposes upon those districts 
that track in violation of Equal Protection the “affirmative duty 
‘to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school 
system.’ ”297  This analysis enables courts to prohibit further use 
of academic tracking systems by school authorities.298  At the 
same time, this approach allows the issue of how to restructure 
 
290 See Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267. The historical background of a 
decision is particularly strong evidence of segregative intent when “it reveals a 
series of official actions taken for invidious purposes.” Id. 
291 See supra notes 61–70. 
292 See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text; see also Vill. of Arlington 
Heights, 429 U.S. at 267 (“The specific sequence of events leading up [sic] the 
challenged decision also may shed some light on the decisionmaker’s purposes.”). 
293 See supra Part I.A. 
294 See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 210–11 (1973) (“If the actions of 
school authorities were to any degree motivated by segregative intent and the 
segregation resulting from those actions continues to exist, the fact of remoteness in 
time certainly does not make those actions any less ‘intentional.’ ”). 
295 See supra Part I. 
296 See supra Part I. 
297 Keyes, 413 U.S. at 203 (quoting Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)). 
298 See People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 534 (7th Cir. 
1997) (“[D]ecrees which prohibit specified conduct are generally preferable to those 
that impose affirmative duties.”). 
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student placement procedures in the absence of tracking to be 
left to the discretion of school authorities, so long as the 
procedures adopted are genuinely non-discriminatory.299  In this 
way, the approach proposed by this Note maintains educational 
flexibility while more closely adhering to Brown I’s central 
holding than do current legal analyses of academic tracking 
systems. 
CONCLUSION 
Even if it were a race-neutral practice, academic tracking is 
an inappropriate pedagogy in today’s society.  Economically 
sustainable employment options increasingly require a college 
education, and the purpose of secondary education is now, 
primarily, to prepare all students to pursue a college education.  
In such a climate, an educational method premised on the belief 
that only some students should be prepared for post-secondary 
education is no longer viable.  Thus, academic tracking affects 
students well beyond junior high and high school.  It impacts 
their chances of success in college in a very real way, and for 
those students in the lower levels, it substantially limits their 
occupational choices and potential for financial mobility.  When 
the racial effects of academic tracking are taken into account, it 
becomes clear that academic tracking perpetuates inequalities.  
Such a system not only segregates in violation of Brown I, but it 
fails to even meet the basic requirements of Plessy:  Academic 
tracking sets up separate academic paths that are explicitly 
unequal and that lead to unequal life chances.  If Equal 
Protection is to mean anything to the countless students 
currently deprived of a meaningful education, it must mean that 
these modern day systems of school segregation cannot be 
permitted to persist. 
 
 
299 See id. at 536 (noting that school authorities are better equipped than courts 
to make decisions regarding educational policy). However, if a school district fails in 
its affirmative duty to “eliminate . . . all vestiges” of the segregation caused by 
tracking practices, the courts may appropriately order further remedies. See Swann 
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). 
